Statement by H.E. Mr. Hiroyuki Yamamoto

Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament

At the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee

for the 2015 Review Conference of NPT

- Cluster III Specific Issue -

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other provisions of the Treaty

Geneva, 1 May 2013

Mr. Chairman,

During the discussion in Cluster III, I expressed Japan’s determination to strengthen global nuclear security, in the context of Japan’s general position on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Given the importance of this issue, I wish to elaborate today on several concrete measures in this regard. In addition, I will touch upon Japan’s view of the provision for withdrawal from the NPT.

Mr. Chairman,

As mentioned in our Cluster III statement, following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, Japan has made significant reforms to its nuclear regulatory system. The Nuclear Regulation Authority, which was established last September, was given the role as an interagency coordinator with regard to nuclear security. Since then, the NRA has been actively working to strengthen nuclear security through new projects such as establishment of a study team on nuclear security.

Let me introduce some of the practical measures we have taken to strengthen the security of our nuclear facilities.

Japan has increased the number of armed security personnel and strengthened its system of patrols. We will continue to examine ways for security authorities to provide effective support to nuclear facilities.

We have also made it operators’ obligation to designate limited access areas and install high enough structured barriers and intrusion detectors in nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities. Moreover, the barriers of important facilities such as power supplies and cooling facilities are required to be more resistant than before.

Mr. Chairman,

International cooperation involving close coordination among all relevant countries, as well as cooperation with the IAEA, is essential in our efforts to prevent the risk of theft from countries with weak protection. In this regard, the IAEA should play the key role in the development of nuclear security guidance, as well as safety standards, based on best practices. Japan will continue to work together with the IAEA and other international organizations to strengthen global nuclear security and looks forward to the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security to be held in Vienna in July this year.

Since the establishment of the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security in Japan, we have organized regional training courses on the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, and seminars on nuclear security and non-proliferation outside of Japan, in order to upgrade human resources and technological infrastructure. Japan will continue to actively contribute to the enhancement of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security through this Support Center.

Mr. Chairman,

The 2010 NPT Review Conference, despite its success, was unfortunately not able to reach consensus on the issue of withdrawal, one of the most important and pressing problems facing the NPT regime. We need to deepen our deliberations to achieve consensus on this matter in order to obtain at the next Review Conference an outcome that will strengthen the NPT regime.

Needless to say, our debate on this issue should not be aimed at limiting the sovereign right of any State Party to withdraw from the Treaty, as recognized under Article X of the Treaty. However, in order to maintain the integrity and universality of the NPT, withdrawal from the Treaty should be prevented to the extent possible. In addressing the issue of withdrawal, my delegation believes it is important to take a holistic approach, both to encourage States Parties to remain parties to the NPT and to discourage them from withdrawing, in particular in a way that abuses this right.

Firstly, States Parties should recall the benefits conferred by the NPT, which serves as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In view of this, the 2010 NPT Action Plan, including actions pertaining to concrete measures for nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances (NSAs), and promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, should be fully and faithfully implemented.

Secondly, States Parties should specifically address how to respond to any withdrawal from the NPT, in particular if carried out in a manner that abuses this right. For any NPT Party to withdraw while diverting peaceful nuclear supplies for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons, for example, would be an abuse. Furthermore, it could threaten international peace and security.

There are a number of specific possible measures that we can consider, such as bilateral, regional or international consultations with the withdrawing Party prior to the effective date of withdrawal; continuity of international safeguards on materials and equipment obtained by the Party prior to withdrawal from the Treaty; and inclusion of dismantlement or return clauses in legally-binding supply agreements with other State Parties.

In addition, States Parties should reaffirm that it is consistent with international law to hold a withdrawing Party responsible for violations committed prior to its withdrawal.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.